Scientists overwhelmingly agree that climate change (CC) exists and is caused by human activity. It has been argued that communicating the consensus can counter climate scepticism, given that perceived scientific consensus (PSC) is a major factor predicting public belief that climate change is anthropogenic. However, individuals may hold different models of science, potentially affecting their interpretation of scientific consensus. Using representative surveys in the UK, France, Germany, and Norway, we assessed whether the relationship between PSC and belief in anthropogenic CC is conditioned by a person's viewing science as 'the search for truth' or as 'debate'. Results show that PSC is higher among CC believers and moreover, significantly predicts belief in anthropogenic CC. This relationship is stronger among people holding a model of science as the 'search for truth'. These results help to disentangle the effect of implicit epistemological assumptions underlying the public understanding of the CC debate.
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The need for deep changes in our lifestyles due to climate change has highlighted the necessity to understand how science communication might affect people's belief that climate change is caused by human activity, and their subsequent behavioural choices (e.g. Pidgeon, 2012) . Research has robustly shown that 97% of peer-reviewed published scientific papers on the topic agree that recent global warming is anthropogenic (cf. Cook et al., 2016) . However, around the year 2009 opinion polls in Europe and United States started showing a substantial increase in the number of persons who appeared to question the link between climate change and human activity (Poortinga et al., 2011; Smith and Leiserowitz, 2012) .
The perceived level of scientific consensus has been found to be one of the main factors influencing public beliefs as to whether climate change is anthropogenic (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; McCright et al., 2013) . In response to a public increasingly doubtful of about the anthropogenic origins of climate change it has been argued that communicating the scientific consensus can be used to counter climate sceptical beliefs (van der Linden et al. 2015; van der Linden et al, 2017) . These studies and suggested strategies for communication however do not consider the assumptions that underlie people's perception of scientific consensus. Indeed, individuals may hold different models of science (or of scientific activity), which might affect their interpretation of news about scientific consensus. These underlying models or views of science involve qualitatively different interpretations of uncertainty, data, and news.
We propose in this article that information about scientific consensus concerning anthropogenic climate change might mean different things when interpreted under alternative subjective epistemic models; we distinguish a model of science as a 'search for truth', or as a 'debate'. A model assuming the existence of a single universal truth, one that can be unveiled by the rigorous application of scientific methods (e.g. Bacon, 1620 Bacon, /1981 , was defended and became widely accepted as one outcome of the Scientific Revolution. This model views science as capable of differentiating between what is true and what is not true by using codified methods (Newton, 1704 (Newton, /1981 . This vision of science as the 'search for truth' was challenged by the seminal work of Thomas Kuhn (1962) , who showed the activity of science to embrace the co-existence, debate and possibly the substitution of conceptions of reality, or paradigms. Here research paradigms "are part of normal science, an enterprise that aims to refine, extend, and articulate a paradigm that is already in existence" (Kuhn, 1995, p. 198) . This model of science acknowledges diversity in paradigms as part of the "interpretative enterprise [which] can only articulate a paradigm, not correct it" (Kuhn, 1995, p.198) . In this latter approach to science as 'debate', the validity of a claim is acknowledged within a given paradigm, opening the possibility that differing judgments on the validity of facts or their interpretation may exist simultaneously under differing paradigms.
The fact that models of science shared among scientists appear historically to have become progressively more complex -including a diversity of proposals for the relationship between science and reality (Sorell, 2013) -does not necessarily mean that a similar transition of models has taken place in other societal groups (Moscovici, 1988) . Jaspal et al. (2012) suggest that it is more likely that a variety of models for interpreting scientific results coexist among the public.
Assuming the two models of science -a 'search for truth' versus 'debate' -coexist as parallel belief systems opens the possibility that members of the public differ in how they interpret information about scientific consensus on climate change depending on the epistemic model they hold. Examining the interpretation of ambiguous information regarding climate change, Rabinovich and Morton (2012) presented messages containing different degrees of uncertainty to participants adopting respectively a model of science as a 'search for truth' or 'debate'. Their results suggest that participants sharing a model of science as 'debate' (a so-called Kuhnian model) were more convinced by high uncertainty messages than were participants sharing a model of science as a 'search for truth'.
Our research focuses on the question of how models of science interact with the interpretation of perceived scientific consensus in shaping individuals' belief in anthropogenic climate change. We take these models of science as shared belief systems encompassing assumptions about the character of science, which may lead to individuals giving distinct weight to the level of scientific consensus as they perceive it. We hypothesize that under a model of science as a 'search for truth', perceived scientific consensus is central to the individual's establishing a judgment of facts as 'truth', while under a model of science as 'debate' the degree of scientific consensus perceived by the individual plays a less determinant role in assessing validity of claims -here, claims about the anthropogenic nature of climate change. In short, we will assess how convincing the information about scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change is for people adopting a model of science as a 'search for truth' compared to a model of science as 'debate'.
The influence of adhering to a model of science as a 'search for truth' versus as 'debate' has been demonstrated in controlled experimental settings (Rabinovich and Morton, 2012) . We propose to analyse this relationship across four representative samples (France, Germany, Norway and the UK; Steentjes et al., 2017) . This would help demonstrate whether and how this process takes place in a wide variety of socioeconomic contexts within and across countries, through directly comparable samples.
Below we first review recent studies analysing public perceptions of climate change, in particular regarding beliefs (including scepticism) as to its existence, causes and impacts.
Then we explore the literature on how perceived scientific consensus is associated with climate change beliefs. Then, based on our survey data, we explore simultaneously in the four national contexts: (1) how perceived scientific consensus predicts individuals' beliefs in anthropogenic climate change; and (2) whether this relation is stronger (or weaker) when the adopted model is that of science as a 'search for truth' (as opposed to science as 'debate').
Public scepticism or recognition of anthropogenic climate change
Independently of the actual existence or progression of climate change, studies reviewing public opinion on the issue found that it emerged as a public concern around the 1980s (Capstick, Whitmarsh and Poortinga, 2015) . In the late 1980s and early 1990s it was common for people to associate climate change with other types of locally observed pollution, CFC and ozone depletion (Brechin, 2003) . The percentage of people concerned about climate change then grew sharply in the 1990s, both in the US and Europe (Capstick et al., 2015) . This trend of increasing concern was observed until around the mid-2000s. Then the public started to more clearly differentiate climate change from other environmental issues.
Shared representations identified through open survey responses included for example melting ice, weather and heat (Leiserowitz, 2005; Lorenzoni et al., 2006) .
As of the mid-2010s the public in the US, UK, Australia and Europe also started to grow increasingly sceptical of climate change (Capstick et al., 2015) . In the US, Smith and Leiserowitz (2012) demonstrated this growing scepticism in four waves of representative public opinion surveys (between 2002 and 2010 ). Yet, not all publics evolved in the same way: starting from the late 1990s US respondents identifying as Democrats became increasingly concerned about climate change, while Republicans became more sceptical about it (Dunlap and McCright, 2008) . A 2018 survey in the US shows a regain of concern over the topic independently of political affiliation (Leiserowitz et al., 2018) A cross-national study by Tranter and Booth (2015) found that English-speaking countries in general (USA, England, Australia and New Zealand) are among the most sceptical in regard to climate change, with Northern European countries (e.g. Sweden, Finland and Norway) also displaying high climate scepticism. Lower scepticism levels, in contrast, are found among another group of western European countries -for example, Spain, France, Austria and Germany (Tranter and Booth, 2015) . In a survey conducted in Germany, Engels and colleagues (2013) found climate scepticism to be overall very low (about 7%) in the country, with Germans being significantly less sceptical of anthropogenic climate change than people in the English-speaking world or people in Nordic countries such as Norway (Tranter and Booth, 2015) . This result was not entirely borne out by Steentjes et al. (2017) , who found German respondents at 16% to be significantly more sceptical of anthropogenic climate change than were Norwegian (4%), French (6%) and UK (12%) respondents.
Studies conducted in the English-speaking world provide further information on individual contextual factors that influence climate change perceptions. Older people (Poortinga et al., 2011) , persons positioning themselves on the political right (Dunlap and McCright, 2008; Poortinga et al., 2011; Whitmarsh, 2011) , and those adopting more individualistic worldviews (Kahan et al., 2011) are more likely to be sceptical about the existence, causes and/or impacts of climate change. In a study of different profiles of climate scepticism in the UK, Poortinga and colleagues (2011) found a small minority of 'trend sceptics' -those who deny that the climate is undergoing change (4% in 2005 and 15% in 2010). Poortinga et al. (2011) showed, however, that other types of scepticism were more frequent in the 2010 sample. For example, 'impact sceptics' -identified as those who do not think climate change will lead to substantial impacts -made up 69% of respondents who agreed climate change is happening. 'Attribution sceptics' -those who question that climate change is caused by human activity -comprised 18% of the total sample. Whitmarsh (2011) found that trend scepticism was higher among older, rural respondents who were also nonadopters of pro-environmental behaviours. Moreover, political affiliation ('vote conservative') was seen to be the strongest predictor of trend scepticism in 2008. This and other studies demonstrate a strong association between climate scepticism and political orientation, especially among Anglophone societies (Engels et al., 2013; Hornsey et al., 2016) . The same association has moreover been found worldwide by two analyses of the International Social Survey Programme data on climate change covering respectively -2009 (Kvaløy, Finseraas and Listhaug, 2012 and 2010 (Tranter and Booth, 2015) . However, the overall picture is far from being established and further contextual variables would appear to be relevant. Despite the lower levels of climate scepticism in most European countries, the phenomenon of scepticism across Europe seems to be at least partially explained by the same political affiliation variables as in the English-speaking world. Both McCright et al. (2016) 's analysis of the May 2008 Eurobarometer data (Eurobarometer, 2017) and Hornsey et al. (2016) 's meta-analysis of the determinants of climate change beliefs showed that climate sceptic views are more common among right-than left-wing respondents. The same result is found by Steentjes et al. (2017) .
Perceived scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change
The influence of perceived scientific consensus regarding anthropogenic climate change on the public's climate beliefs has been studied under two main perspectives: either as a precursor to other climate attitudes, or as a consequence of motivated reasoning. Under the first perspective, perceived scientific consensus is seen as a 'gateway' belief. It is understood as an indicator of a group norm: The degree of consensus perceived by a given individual is aligned with a 'socially valid version' of climate change facts as defined by the individual's reference group (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; van der Linden et al., 2017) . Van der Linden et al. (2015) affirm that perceived scientific consensus -taken as a socially valid version of reality -is central to public climate change beliefs. The predictive power of perceived scientific consensus in relation to climate change beliefs has been demonstrated both experimentally (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; van der Linden et al., 2015) and through survey studies. For example, McCright et al. (2013) showed how perceived scientific consensus predicts climate change beliefs and support for public policies in the US. That said, perceived scientific consensus was seen in the same study to be itself influenced by other value-based beliefs such as respondents' political orientation and environmental identity.
In the same vein, perceived scientific consensus has been analysed in explicit juxtaposition with value-based beliefs including worldviews and political orientations. Lewandowsky et al. (2012) found that information about perceived scientific consensus is climate change than those holding egalitarian-communitarian worldviews (Kahan et al., 2011, Study 1) . Moreover, higher levels of trust and competence are attributed to experts whose positions are aligned (versus non-aligned) with those of the participants (Study 2). The same dynamic was described by Kahan et al. (2012) in a study questioning the association commonly found between climate change beliefs and scientific literacy. That study shows that education, which can be assumed to be related to scientific literacy, is positively rather than negatively related to the degree of polarization concerning climate change beliefs between people holding different worldviews, which Kahan et al. (2012) interpreted to be a result of identity concerns. In this regard, Kahan et al. (2012) propose that "what guides individual risk perception is not the truth of those beliefs [perceptions] but rather their congruence with individuals' cultural commitments" (p. 734).
Models of science
Few studies have sought to analyse explicitly how scientific consensus may be interpreted by differing populations, and the consequences their interpretation may have for beliefs about anthropogenic climate change. In an attempt to fill this gap, Rabinovich and Morton (2012) propose that an individual's interpretation of scientific debate may influence, or be influenced by, the model of science -as a 'search for truth' or 'debate' -held by that individual. Their study compared interpretations of messages communicating a high versus a low degree of consensus. Subjects were presented with messages indicating varying degrees of consensus, such as: "six out of ten experts agree that…" (low consensus 3 ) or "nine out of ten experts agree that global warming may make more than a quarter of all species extinct" (high consensus) (p. 996). Then they asked participants to report "how likely they were to perform a number of environmental behaviours during the following month" and "how willing they were to support the introduction of household carbon budgets". The latter variables were intended to assess whether, and to what degree, participants had been convinced by the consensus-related information that they had received. The authors found that messages indicating lower consensus led to messages being seen as less convincing to those holding a model of science as 'truth', compared to people holding a model of science as 'debate' (Rabinovich and Morton, 2012 The assumptions implicit in each of these models of science thus provide frames for the interpretation of discourse indicating degrees of scientific consensus. Depending on the model of science solicited, perceived scientific consensus can be adapted to contribute to either a climate sceptical position or to one endorsing conventional climate science.
This Study
Our study aims to disentangle the influence of models of science as an interpretative frame for perceived scientific consensus using a survey conducted simultaneously in four
European countries (France, Germany, Norway and UK). We examine the role of perceived scientific consensus in anthropogenic climate change beliefs (cf. van der Linden et al., 2015) .
We furthermore test whether the subjective interpretation of science as a 'search for truth' versus a 'debate' moderates this role. To our knowledge, this is the first time that such an effect of model of science is analysed in a large, comparative international survey with nationally representative and simultaneously drawn samples across countries.
Based on the experimental results of Rabinovich and Morton (2012) , we expect that among individuals for whom science is a 'search for truth,' the relationship between perceived scientific consensus and belief in anthropogenic climate change would be stronger.
Conversely, we expect that among individuals for whom science is a 'debate,' the relationship between perceived scientific consensus and belief in anthropogenic climate change would be weaker.
The model of science variable is here assessed through a single, bi-polar item. This measure was shown to significantly discriminate how participants described science after being exposed to definitions of science as 'search for truth' or science as 'debate' (Rabinovich and Morton, 2012, Study 2) . The scale used by Rabinovich and Morton (2012) was however composed by four items presenting a good internal consistency (α = .72). Considering that major international surveys often involve limitations of space, the assessment of the model of science variable was done through a single, bi-polar item. To our knowledge this scale has been used up to now only in an experimental context. Our survey study investigates how and the degree to which different models of science, as measured by this specific item, might affect the way climate scientific consensus information is interpreted. Science beliefs however involve wider and more complex logics that are beyond the scope of this article.
Moreover, in line with cultural cognition theory (Kahan et al., 2011) we aim to explore whether the perceived scientific consensus is independent of climate change belief or, as predicted by Kahan et al. (2011) , climate change believers perceive more scientific consensus than do sceptics. This hypothesis is based on Kahan's suggestion that the individual is motivated to confirm pre-existing climate change beliefs (e.g. Kahan et al., 2009 Kahan et al., , 2012 .
Our four nationally representative surveys, conducted concurrently (Steentjes et al., 2017) , provide an opportunity to explore the stated hypotheses within the national-level climate context (cf. Tranter and Booth, 2015) and within a common European frame (cf. Baker, 2007) . Our study also controls for other individual-level variables that have in the past been associated with higher degrees of climate scepticism, such as gender, education and political orientation (Poortinga et al., 2011; Hornsey et al., 2016) . 
Procedure and sample
The EPCC collaboration involved the development of an harmonised survey in four different languages with reference to a structured socio-political analysis of the four countries 4 . Translation, quality assurance and piloting procedures adopted by the team ensured that questions were interpreted in the same way across the different countries, allowing comparative analyses.
A first English version of the questionnaire was translated into the other three Table   1 . In France, Germany and the UK, the survey was administered face-to-face. In Norway interviews were conducted by telephone because of the high population dispersion. The total length of the interview ranged from 22 to 28 minutes (France: 28 min.; Germany: 23 min.;
4 EPCC integrated an international stakeholder advisory panel which helped to construct socio-political country reports and the survey instrument by pointing to areas of climate change perceptions they felt merited attention. The panel furthermore provided guidance on some key dimensions of analysis.
Norway: 24 min.; UK: 22 min. to be mentioned as forming part of the context of the overall survey results (see Steentjes et al., 2017) .
Variables
Model of science. Beliefs about science were measured by an item used by Rabinovich and Morton (2012) : "There may be more than one correct answer to most scientific questions" (from 1 = Strongly agree to 5 = Strongly disagree). 
Data analysis
Regression and analyses of variance were performed. The 'model of science' variable, which we hypothesise to moderate the relation between perceived scientific consensus and anthropogenic climate change beliefs, was treated as a continuous moderating variable.
The regression and moderation analyses were run using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013; Hayes and Matthes, 2009 ). The advantage of this method for testing a moderation is that it produces, in the same output model, different regression coefficients for the predictor at different levels of the moderator variable (model of science) (Hayes, 2013) .
Results

Descriptive results
In this section we present the descriptive results of the variables that will later be used in the regression models.
'Belief in climate change' corresponds to the belief that climate change is happening, and 'belief in anthropogenic climate change', to the belief that it is caused by human activity rather than by a natural process. were found for belief in anthropogenic climate change, also higher in UK and Germany in relation to France and Norway, as displayed in Table 2 (Steentjes et al., 2017) . In summary, respondents from Germany and the UK believe less strongly that climate change is real and anthropogenic than their French and Norwegian counterparts.
As for perceived scientific consensus, people in the UK and Germany perceive less consensus among the scientific community than do people in France and Norway (see Table   2 ).
The expressed preference for a given model of science also differs across countries although the pattern is different. Means of all countries are above the midpoint of the scale.
Thus, participants in all countries lean towards a model of science as 'debate'. This is most prominently the case Norway. Relatively speaking, participants from Germany are the ones who most strongly endorse a model of science as 'the search for truth'. Participants in UK and
France are in an intermediary position between these two countries (see Scheffé post hoc analysis, Table 2 ). Table 2 about here *** As for self-reported political orientation, a centrist tendency is seen in all four countries. Still, there are small but systematic differences, with a stronger leftist leaning found in France, Germany and UK in relation to Norway (Bonferroni pairwise comparisons, all ps < .05).
***Insert
These descriptive results show some interesting differences in relation to previously reported international surveys of climate change public perception. Past research (Engels et al., 2013) showed Germans displaying very low percentages of climate scepticism.
Norwegians have figured in the past among the most climate-sceptical European countries (Tranter and Booth, 2015) . As shown above, our results, in contrast, show the German population as the most climate sceptical among the countries surveyed, and Norway the least.
Perceived science consensus and climate change beliefs
Our results above presented a pattern: Where perceived scientific consensus is lower (Germany and UK) respondents also believe less in the reality of climate change (trend scepticism) and in its anthropogenic origin (attribution scepticism). We now explore in more depth the relationship between perceived scientific consensus and belief in climate change.
We performed a 4 (country: France, Germany, Norway, UK) X 2 (trend sceptic: yes, no) between-subjects ANOVA on the perceived scientific consensus variable. In line with the data presented above, we found a significant main effect of country [F(3,3592 climate change is real tend to perceive more scientific consensus than do trend sceptics.
Interpreting perceived scientific consensus under different models of science
We have hypothesized that models of science influence individuals' interpretation of perceived scientific consensus. We thus assume that perceived scientific consensus is a more or less convincing argument in support of anthropogenic climate change depending on a person's view on science. We therefore treat the model of science ('search for truth' versus 'debate') as a moderator of the relationship between perceived scientific consensus and belief in anthropogenic climate change.
Our outcome variable, belief in anthropogenic climate change, was entered in a regression analysis to test the degree to which it can be explained by (1) control variables:
gender, age, education, political orientation, plus our focal predictor variables perceived scientific consensus and science model, and (2) Among the variables entered in the first block, educational level was found to be positively associated with anthropogenic climate change belief (see Table 3 ): People with a university degree tend to have stronger belief in anthropogenic climate change than people without such a degree. Age and political orientation are negatively associated with belief in anthropogenic climate change: older people and people of right-leaning political orientation tend to believe less in anthropogenic climate change. When these variables are controlled, participants in France were seen overall to have stronger belief in anthropogenic climate change than participants in other countries (see also Table 2 ).
***Insert table 3 about here***
To analyse the relation of perceived scientific consensus with the belief in anthropogenic climate change under different models of science, perceived scientific consensus and model of science were initially entered as individual variables in the first block. Then in a second block they were entered in an interaction. Results presented in Table   3 show that both perceived scientific consensus (B = .37, p < .001) and holding a model of science as 'debate' (B = .14, p < .01) are independently and positively associated with belief in anthropogenic climate change.
Moreover, the interaction term whereby the joint effect of perceived scientific consensus under model of science is tested is significant. This result suggests that the power of perceived scientific consensus to predict belief in anthropogenic climate change varies with the degree to which one or another model of science is endorsed. In Table 3 It is possible however that a more complex model including variables associated with emotions, social norms and environmental values would increase the variance explained (Adj R 2 = .14). However, we have chosen for this study to exclusively focus on the predictive power of science-related variables.
Discussion
The goal of this paper was to analyse how epistemological beliefs and the interpretation of relevant information influence beliefs about climate change. More specifically, we examined the strength of the relationship between perceived scientific consensus and anthropogenic climate change beliefs under two models of science: as a 'search for truth' or as 'debate'. In light of previous experimental studies (Rabinovich and Morton, 2012) , we anticipated that when individuals hold a model of science as seeking the 'truth', those who perceive a high degree of scientific consensus are more likely to believe that climate change is caused by humans.
Our results from a four-country survey indeed support this hypothesis. Even though the people sharing a model of science as 'debate' also tended to believe more in anthropogenic climate change as their perceived scientific consensus increased (Table 3) , we found that for people sharing a model of science as 'search for truth,' perceived scientific consensus is a stronger predictor of anthropogenic climate change beliefs. Furthermore, besides the effects of perceived scientific consensus and of model of science taken individually, the interaction between these two variables also contributes to significantly explaining individuals' belief in anthropogenic climate change.
Given the small percentages of people bluntly denying climate change in our survey, creating a ceiling effect, it was not possible to run the same regression model using the 'belief in the reality of climate change' item.
These results demonstrate how assumptions implicit in different understandings of how science works may affect the way information about scientific consensus is interpreted.
The small but significant effect that we found suggests that the degree to which a person agrees that "There may be more than one correct answer to most scientific questions" reveals qualitatively different interpretations of the uncertainty behind climate science, in particular those interpretations of the level of scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change (Jaspal, Nerlich and Koteyko, 2012; Callaghan and Augoustinos, 2013) . That said, we cannot rule out the influence of broader social representations (Moscovici, 2001) Rossiter , 2007; Lantian et al., 2016) . In cross-national research into public perceptions of climate change, single item measures are indeed common for practical reasons and have not been seen to undermine valuable contributions to understanding how opinions about environmental issues are formed and shaped by cultural or national differences (e.g. Demski et al., 2018; Lee, Markowitz, Howe, Ko and Leiserowitz, 2015; Smith and Leiserowitz, 2014) . Our single-item scale presents good internal consistency with a four-item scale that has significantly differentiated the adoption of models of science in an experimental setting (Rabinovich and Morten, 2012) . While these precedents indicate that the chosen research methodology is adequate to support the findings as stated, further research using a larger set of items would be of great value to yield deeper insight into models of science and their impacts. Moreover, this epistemological inquiry could be extended to research on the perception of other risk objects such as disease protection through vaccination-given that like climate sceptics, anti-vaccination movements obtain or create a media platform for their challenges to scientific information as well as to science per se. Perceived scientific consensus has been shown to be an important predictive variable for belief in anthropogenic climate change (van der Linden et al., 2015) . This is in accordance with another of our findings: in comparison to those who accept conventional climate science, climate sceptics -persons denying the existence (trend) of climate change or denying that climate change can be attributed to humans -tend indeed to perceive less consensus among climate scientists. Still our data indicate that we must be attentive to what individuals infer when they are exposed to information about scientific consensus in general, and about climate change in particular (Kahan et al., 2011) . Our study underlines the importance of considering the effect of epistemological beliefs on individuals' interpretation of information about the climate, and the use they make in that interpretation of a perceived consensus or lack of consensus.
Conclusion
Our results suggest that when forming climate change beliefs, assumptions made under different models of science shape the individual's interpretation of perceived consensus or lack of consensus among scientists, and that this process holds across many different social groups. Our study is the first to demonstrate this moderating effect in representative national samples from different countries (France, Germany, Norway and UK).
The overwhelmingly high percentage of published scientists who agree with the reality of anthropogenic climate change (i.e., the high degree of scientific consensus) has proven to be a strong argument against climate sceptical positions (van der Linden et al., 2015) . However, results from our and other studies suggest that public communication highlighting high scientific consensus should be accompanied by awareness of possible unintended effects. Communicative acts that convey or assume that a single 'truth' exists may undermine the individual capacity to process ambiguous information (Rabinovich and Morton, 2012) , which nonetheless continues to flow in societal debate, media presentation of climate change, and other public discourse. If the idea of a single 'truth' is implicit in public discourse and communications, people are more vulnerable to sceptical arguments than when an idea of science as 'debate' is implicit or acknowledged. Our results have shown this effect to be small, but systematic.
The way communications about climate change are understood and interpreted is influenced by a multitude of factors, of which the expression of scientific consensus and the recipient's epistemic beliefs are crucial components (Bostrom, Böhm and O'Connor, 2018) .
In the public debate and in the media the lines between legitimate and non-legitimate scientific discourse are blurred (Antilla, 2005) . Considering the variety of information and of sources to which people are exposed every day, societal communication of a model of science as 'debate' could reinforce the individual's critical discernment of the source of information and its context. By contrast, implying the existence of single, exclusive truths shifts the debate away from assessing the validity of methods, presuppositions, and the quality of scientific arguments, to centre instead on whether or not scientists are unanimous. Instead of acting as a barrier to action ("little consensus among scientists or other sources, therefore no evidence to justify change in my behaviour"), the provision of contradictory and uncertain information would, under a model of science as 'debate', inspire a greater sense of being confidently informed about the different positions of a debate (Rabinovich and Morton, 2012) . This manner of interpreting scientific debate is associated with a deeper question about the relativity of social knowledge (Moscovici, 2001 ) and how its 'reality' emerges from the fact that it is socially shared and validated by different social groups. In this sense, the adoption of a model of science as 'debate' is closer to a constructionist view of reality. For participants adopting a model of science as 'debate', reality -and more specifically, science -is not absolute but relative since it is socially produced and validated knowledge (e.g. Bertoldo et al., 2016) .
In this way, communicating a view of science as 'debate' would potentially buffer against forming scepticism in the face of contradictory information about climate change, instead reinforcing the motivation to critically analyse the context in which scientific information is produced. Future research could explore the potential effects of including a particular 'message within the message' communicating about the nature of science as well as about scientific findings and consensus. 
